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INTRODUCTION
Panic in the face of danger is an understandable human response.  Yet, as
fiction author Katherine Paterson has written, "[T]o  fear is one thing.  To let
fear  grab  you  by  the  tail  and  swing  you  around  is  another."'   Bruce
Ackerman's book, Before the Next Attack,2 is  to be commended  for urging
us  to  guard  against  overreactions  to  terrorism  and  for  proposing  detailed
safeguards  to  confine  overreactions.  Also  admirable  are  the  book's
thorough  analysis of the United States'  current confrontation  with terrorism
and the  book's  reliance  on historical  examples  from  around  the  world  to
justify  the  author's  proposals.  Nevertheless,  the book  contains  a  serious
flaw:  The  book  shifts  from  a  frank  acknowledgment  of the  problems
generated  by  confronting  terrorism  to  a kind  of utopianism  that  ignores
many of those very problems.  Ackerman's  work, in other words, alternates
between pessimism and optimism.  Perhaps  such shifting is an occupational
hazard  of advocating  for  civil  liberties  in  the  shadow  of terrorist  threats.
My  thoughts below on Ackerman's  book will no doubt betray a similar mix
of  pessimism  and  optimism.  Part  I discusses  five  of the  book's  most
important  contributions,  while  Part  II  criticizes  the  book's  analyses,
especially  in  light  of recent  U.S.  experiences.  Part  II also  argues  that
"security,"  not  Ackerman's  theory  of  "emergency,"  should  be  the
conceptual  foundation  guiding  the  government's  policies  against  terrorist
threats.  Finally,  Part  III develops  policy  changes  that  are  needed  for the
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1.  Katherine  Peterson, Jacob Have I Loved 63  (Harper Trophy  1990) (1980).
2.  Bruce  Ackerman,  Before  the Next Attack:  Preserving  Civil Liberties  in an Age of
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U.S.  to  advance  security  as  what once  may have  seemed  like a  short-term
confrontation with terrorism becomes recognized  as a chronic condition.
I.  ACKERMAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS
Before  the  Next  Attack  makes  five  significant  contributions:  (1)
anticipating  fear  and  overreaction  to  terror;  (2)  developing  concrete  plans
that  could be  valuable  in  a crisis and  could  sharpen  the  public's  sense  of
priorities;  (3) predicting  the  long-term  consequences  for our constitutional
democracy  from short-term  responses to terrorism;  (4)  subjecting all of the
government's  policy  initiatives  regarding  terrorism  to  constitutional
analysis;  and  (5)  rejecting  "war"  and  "criminal  justice"  as  the  legal
justifications  for  the  United  States'  responses  to  terror.  The  paragraphs
below discuss these  contributions further.
Ackerman's  first  contribution  is  addressing  two  genuine  features  of
human  fear:  overreaction and poor judgment in a crisis.  Our Constitution's
framers proceeded  with frank acknowledgement  of human self-interest and
used  it  deliberately  in  the  institutional  design  of  our  government.
Ackerman  similarly  acknowledges  human  self-interest  in  describing  the
risks of overreaction to terror.  A more detailed treatment of psychological
reactions  to  fear,  however,  would  clarify  the  scope  of  the  risks  and
potentially  identify  resources  for institutional  reform.  We  know that fear
makes us overreact and misjudge.  For example,  Cass Sunstein has recently
canvassed  the  empirical  research  about  human  perceptions  of risks  and
attending fear.3  Sunstein describes how people think that risks that they can
imagine are  especially  likely to actualize,  regardless  of evidence,  and how
people  tend  to  focus  on  worst-case  scenarios  without  discounting  for
probability.  Furthermore,  people  tend to  focus  on immediate  risks rather
than  any  long-term  risks  created  by  responding  to  danger.  Although
Ackerman  did not incorporate  such psychological  research  in his analyses,
his work helpfully examines  historical evidence  of overreaction to terrorism
and security  threats  during the  Roman  Empire,  during  the  American  Civil
War,  during  Britain's  handling  of  Northern  Ireland,  and  during  the
European response  to 9/11.  These examples typify political overreaction to
terrorism.  The examples also offer Ackerman the chance to distinguish the
types of threats to a polity's existence:  threats that warrant the most drastic
measures  from  lesser threats.  Ultimately,  Ackerman  argues  that the  9/11
attack, and a possible next attack, fall in this lesser category.
Ackerman's  second  contribution  in  Before  the Next Attack  is  hedging
against  predictable  panic  by  suggesting  concrete  plans  that  anticipate  a
terrorist attack against the United States.  Here he emphasizes  the distortion
3.  See Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Laws  of Fear:  Beyond  the  Precautionary  Principle  35-63
(2005).
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of judgment  exercised  in  the  midst  of  emergencies  and  works  out  in
advance  contingency plans for maintaining  government operations in case a
dirty  bomb  or  other  assault  destroys  part  of  a  city  or  a  group  of  key
governmental  actors.  Making  such  plans  in  advance  is  both  wise  and
crucial4  because  human  beings  do  not  think  well  in  emergencies. 5
Ackerman not only calls upon us to do the thinking  in advance;  he provides
guidance  with highly specific plans to put into effect  in the case of the next
emergency.  This  kind  of  contingency  planning  is  vital.  Motivating
officials and voters to adopt anticipatory  plans is  a true challenge,  however,
for the  forces  of inertia  and  denial  operate  here  at  least  as  much  as they
explain why so few people prepare for their deaths by writing wills.6
Hence,  Ackerman joins  Congressman  Brian Baird  in  outlining  a  line of
succession  in  the  event  that  terrorist  acts  incapacitate  state  governors,
congressional  representatives,  senators,  or  U.S.  Supreme  Court  Justices. 7
Ackerman  also  calls  for  a  "supermajoritarian  escalator"  through  a
framework  statute  to  control  presidential  power  by  requiring  increasing
numbers  of congressional  votes to  extend emergency  measures over time.8
Throughout  his  book,  Ackerman  seeks  to  ensure  that  counterterrorism
measures suspending usual rights are only temporary.
Ackerman's  third  contribution  is  championing  long-term  analysis  in  an
effort  to  ensure  that  short-term  responses  to  terrorism  neither  destroy  nor
erode national  constitutional  values.  This  is why  he calls  for successively
escalating  majority-vote  requirements  before  Congress  can  authorize
extensions  of emergency  powers  to  the  executive  branch.  I  admire  the
impulse behind  this important recommendation,  but I doubt  its practicality
on several  levels.  Even if the political will could be mustered to adopt such
a  provision,  nothing  would  prevent  Congress  from  abandoning  the
provision's  terms  by  a  simple  majority  when  it  comes  time  for  the
supermajority  vote.  Moreover,  the  capacity  of  Congress  to  act  as  an
effective  check  would  be  impaired  because  the  executive  maintains  the
power to control  information about terrorist threats  and to shield abuses of
executive  power  from  politicians  and  journalists.  Furthermore,
contemporary  events  in  the  United  States  rebut  the  assumption  that  the
passage  of  time  would  quell  the  sense  of  emergency  justifying  the
4.  See,  e.g.,  Ackerman,  supra note  2,  at  88-90  (describing  how  the  constitutions  of
Poland  and  South  Africa  mandate  that  any  state  of  emergency  has  a  limited  duration
extendable only by the legislative branch).
5.  See, e.g.,  Sunstein, supra note 3,  at 206 ("An understanding of the dynamics of fear
helps explain  why  individuals and governments  often overreact to risks to national  security.
A readily available incident can lead people to exaggerate the threat.").
6.  See  Joel  C.  Dobris  et  al.,  Estates  and  Trusts  62  (2d  ed.  2003)  (noting that  most
Americans  die without wills);  Mary  Louise  Fellows et al.,  Public Attitudes About Property
Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws  in  the  United States,  1978  Am.  B.
Found. Res.  J.  319, 336-40  (describing  the demographics  and attitudes characterizing  testate
and intestate  individuals).
7.  Ackerman,  supra note 2, at  142-68.
8.  Id. at 80-83.
2006]FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
suspension of usual restrictions  on governmental power.  The most obvious
recent  evidence  is  Congress's  recent  affirmation  and  expansion  of
broadened executive powers with the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act five years after 9/11.9
Ackerman's  fourth contribution is to treat the totality of policy initiatives
responding to terror as relevant to constitutional analysis.  He rightly points
out that all of these initiatives  affect the viability of constitutional rights and
checks  and  balances.  Nevertheless,  the  details  of Ackerman's  specific
statutory  framework  for  contingency  planning  and  his  proposal  for  the
supermajority  escalator  are  less  important  than  the  recognition  that  the
Constitution  must not be  forgotten  when  developing  statutes  and practices
to  confront  terrorism.  How  we  arrange  our  governance  to  deal  with
terrorism  will  define  us;  the  extent  to  which  we  are  able  to  mobilize  and
activate  congressional  and judicial  monitoring  will  determine  whether the
checking  function  of the  branches  will persist and  whether  watchdogs  for
individual  rights  will  have  a  voice.  More  fundamentally,  establishing
distinct  statutory bases  for the response  to terror will make  it conceptually
and  politically  easier  to  sever  the  governance  practices  responding  to
terrorist  threats  from  the  law  permitted  by  the  Constitution.  The  laws
responding  to  terrorism  that  are  permitted  to  persist  beyond  short-term
crises must reflect our deepest commitments.  In this context, even statutory
and regulatory proposals  should be understood as part of our "constitution,"
for they will come to constitute us.
A  fifth  vital  contribution  of Ackerman  is rejecting  "war"  and "criminal
justice"  as paradigms  for  the  U.S.  responses  to  terrorism  after  9/11.  He
convincingly  demonstrates  how the  rhetoric of war escalates  both  fear and
executive  power  without  sufficient  evidence.  He  similarly  points  out the
fatal  flaw  of framing  counterterrorism  within  the  conception  of criminal
justice:  Criminal  justice  does  not  offer  a  context  for  taking  national
precautions  or for preventing  further catastrophe,  nor does  it speak to  how
individual rights should be treated outside of criminal prosecutions.
In  rejecting  the  paradigms  of  war  and  criminal  justice,  Ackerman
proposes  that  the  U.S.  couch  counterterrorism  measures  within  the
framework  of responding  to  an  "emergency."  Unfortunately,  his  own
arguments  expose  the  insufficiency  of his  proposed  framework.  Precisely
because  the  terrorist  threat  has  no  obvious  end-point,  the  concept  of an
''emergency"  is  inadequate  to  the  challenge  at  hand  and  would  be
inadequate even in the immediate  aftermath of another attack. 10  The crucial
challenge now is to reject the faulty view that we can and must sacrifice our
9.  Charles  Babington,  Congress  Votes  to  Renew Patriot Act,  With  Changes, Wash.
Post,  Mar.  8, 2006,  at A3.  The  renewal  produced  only  a  slight  restriction  in  the  use  of
subpoenas without judicial approval  in libraries.  The  renewal  also made permanent  all  but
two  provisions  and  enlarged  federal  power  to  engage  in  secret  surveillance  of phones,
records, and homes  of terrorist  suspects. Id.  For other examples  from  recent U.S.  practice
that provide further grounds for doubting Ackerman's presuppositions,  see infra Part II.
10.  See Ackerman, supra note 2, at 58-60.
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commitment  to  fundamental  rights  for what  is imagined  to be  a temporary
emergency:  The  problem  is  not  temporary  and  the  solution  is  not
abandonment  of  our  fundamental  commitments.  Thus,  as  I  will  argue
below,  a  better  framework  is  "security,"  which  is  sufficiently  ample  to
encompass  both  the  advancement  of  our  physical  safety  and  the
preservation  of the very rights that are essential to our security.  Sorting out
the book's strengths and problems requires more criticism.
II.  CRITIQUES  IN LIGHT OF RECENT U.S. EXPERIENCES
Before the Next Attack contains flashes  of optimism.  Unfortunately, the
book's  optimism  is  at  best  utopian  and  at  worst  irrelevant  to  the  actual
scene.  This  is  perplexing  because  Ackerman  pitches  the  project  as  a
realistic  one, cautioning  against  ostrich behavior.  Yet, as discussed  below,
his  key  proposals  are  disconnected  from  real  politics.  Ultimately,
Ackerman's  proposals  are  better  seen  as  a  heuristic  device  framing
potentially useful analyses,  rather than as practical  solutions.
One example  of his proposals'  disconnect from real politics comes from
his  discussion  of  congressional  oversight  committees.  Ackerman's
discussion  begins  by  acknowledging  the  Bush Administration's  efforts  to
keep  detentions  and  surveillance  secret  and to  press for  more  secrecy.  In
that  context,  Ackerman  recommends  that  congressional  oversight
committees  be  guaranteed  minority  members.' 1  This  recommendation
seems both insufficient and unrealistic.  The  secret use of undisclosed off-
shore detention centers and domestic  surveillance techniques emerged  from
journalist  reporting  and  government  leaks-not  from  congressional
oversight. 12  Similarly,  journalists  and  officials  uncomfortable  with  the
Administration's practices  were  responsible  for bringing to public  attention
the Administration's use of coercive interrogation techniques.13
Such  events  indicate  that there  is  no  assurance  that  the Administration
will be forthcoming with anyone in Congress.  Nor is there strong reason to
believe that when  (as now) the same political party controls both Congress
11.  See id. at 83-87.
12.  Committee Schedules Hearings on Bush Censure, Seattle Times,  Mar.  25,  2006,  at
A5  (describing  how  the  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  is  to  hold  hearings  on  Senator  Russ
Feingold's proposed  censure of President  Bush  after the disclosure  of his domestic  spying
program); Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, In Secret Unit's 'Black Room, 'A  Grim Portrait
of U.S. Abuse,  N.Y.  Times,  Mar.  19,  2006,  at  Al.  The  Administration  threatened  to
prosecute  those  responsible  for  leaking  information,  while journalists  received  awards  for
uncovering  the  information.  See,  e.g.,  Dan  Eggen,  White  House Trains Efforts on Media
Leaks; Sources, Reporters Could Be Prosecuted,  Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 2006,  at A1; Robert D.
McFadden, Articles on  C.LA.  Prisons  and Katrina Win Polk Awards, N.Y. Times,  Feb. 21,
2006, at B4 (reporting awards to journalists who uncovered  secret CIA prisons in  Europe).
13.  See Jane Mayer, Annals of the Pentagon: The Memo, New Yorker, Feb.  27, 2006, at
32-41.  President George W.  Bush finally  acknowledged the existence of such secret prisons
in a speech announcing the transfer of those detained in them. Deb Riechmann, Bush Admits
the  CIA  Runs  Secret  Prisons,  ABC  News,  Sept.  7,  2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=2403673.
2006]FORDHA  M LA W RE  VIE W
and  the  executive  branch,  the  congressional  majority  will  push  for,  or
acquiesce  to,  a proposal  to  guarantee  involvement  of minority members  in
crucial  oversight  work.14  Furthermore,  it  is  far from clear  that "minority"
here  includes  individuals  with  real  capacity  for  skepticism,  motivation  to
engage critically,  and distance  from the Administration.  For example, after
leaks  from  the  Administration  revealed  the  Administration's  secret
domestic  spying program,  the Democrats'  flabby resistance  to the  program
came  to  light. 15  Republicans  such  as  Senator  Arlen  Specter,  even  in
arranging  a  compromise  to  exempt  the  domestic  spying  program  from
previous legal restraints, have exercised as much critical  oversight over the
program  as  the  Democrats,  if not  more.16  Thus,  an  important  question
confronts  Ackerman:  How  would  minority  party  members  summon
sufficient  independence  and  courage  to  provide  meaningful  review of the
executive,  given  little  evidence  of  such  abilities  in  the  past?  The  U.S.
experience  since  9/11  gives  no indication  that time's passage  strengthens
political or judicial resistance to the fears raised by terrorism.
Ackerman's  proposed  compensation  for  erroneous  detention  is  another
example  of a disjuncture between  his  suggestions  and the U.S.  experience
since  9/11.  Let  us put  to  one  side  the  political  feasibility  of generating
sufficient support for compensating detainees.17  A more devastating defect
of Ackerman's proposal  is its  reliance on transparency  and self-restraint-
precisely  the  qualities  lacking  in  the  current  Administration's  behavior.
How is the public to learn about the conduct warranting compensation  when
the  government  insists  on keeping  the  conduct  secret?  Consultation  with
congressional  leadership  about  antiterrorism  responses  occurred  in  secret.
Even  hearings  of  the  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Court  remain
undisclosed.  When  the  public  learned  that  this  court's  secret  procedures
were  ignored  by  a  domestic  surveillance  initiative,  Congress  debated
retroactive  authorization  rather than recompense  for those affected  by  it.
18
Even  if there was  political  will to pursue  Ackerman's  compensation  idea,
who would be in a position to know who deserves  it and to ensure that those
eligible actually get it?
A further disjuncture between  Ackerman's book and the  U.S. experience
since  9/11  becomes  apparent  through  his  treatment  of the  case  of Jose
Padilla.  Ackerman  wrote  with  hope  that  the  case  of Jose  Padilla  would
return  to the  Supreme  Court  and offer  the  opportunity  for protecting U.S.
14.  See  Carl  P.  Leubsdorf,  Republicans  Have  Been  Reluctant to  Stand  Up  to  the
Administration,  Dallas  Morning  News  (Online),  Feb.  9,  2006,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/columnists/cleubsdorf/stories/DN
-leubsdorf_09edi.ART. State.Edition I .c616e57.html.
15.  Jeff Zeleny, Democrats Leary of Call  for Censure:  Rebuke of  Bush May Backfire,
Some Fear,  Chi. Trib., Mar. 17,  2006,  §  1, at 3.
16.  See Charlie Savage, Deal on Spy Program in  Works:  Bill Would Let Court  Approve
Wiretaps, Boston Globe, Feb.  28,  2006, at A3.
17.  Cf Ackerman, supra note  2,  at 51-56 (discussing  issues surrounding  compensating
detainees).
18.  Emily Bazelon, Legalize It?, Boston Globe, Feb.  19, 2006, at El.
[Vol.  75THE CONSTITUTION AS BLACK BOX
citizens  from limitless detention.  Ackerman  is  not to  be faulted for failing
to anticipate precisely how the Bush Administration  would maneuver in the
case  of  Padilla,  but  this  history  offers  a  sober  contrast  to  the  book's
optimism.
Padilla is a  U.S. citizen  who was  arrested in the United  States (at O'Hare
Airport) and detained not with charges but with suspicion of plotting a dirty
bomb  attack.  Padilla  became  a central  focus  of the  fight  over executive
power  in  the  response  to  terrorism.  As  the  Administration  held  him  in
detention  without  charges,  it  claimed  the  courts  lacked  authority  to  hear
Padilla's habeas  corpus  challenges.  The Supreme  Court asserted  its power
to hear habeas petitions from "enemy  combatants"  held in detention without
charges, but the Court dismissed an initial petition on the technical  ground
that the petition  named the wrong government  official  and was filed in the
wrong  court.  As  a  second petition,  correcting  that  error,  worked  its  way
back to the Supreme  Court, the federal government transferred Padilla from
military detention  with no  criminal  charges19 and then urged  the  Supreme
Court to dismiss the case as moot.20  The  government chose at this moment
to  charge  him not  with terrorism,  violence,  or even  conspiracy  to commit
violence.  Instead,  as of this writing,  Padilla stands charged with  playing a
role in a conspiracy  to support terrorist groups overseas.21  If Padilla posed
such  great danger  as  to warrant  the  extraordinary  measures  of arresting  a
U.S.  citizen  on U.S.  soil  and holding  him  without charges,  the transfer to
civilian prison with no charges of terrorism or allegations of violence seems
like a considerable  fallback position  for the  government.  Furthermore,  the
government's  treatment  of Padilla echoes  the  Administration's  decision  to
release  Yaser  Hamdi  (conditioned  on  his return  to  Saudi  Arabia  and  his
agreement to give up U.S. citizenship) after the Supreme Court held that the
military  had  to  provide  him  with  a  hearing  about  his  detention  as  a
suspected  terrorist  and  enemy  combatant.  The  treatment  of Padilla  and
Hamdi  raise  real  questions  about  the  capacity  of checks  and  balances  to
work even several years after the 9/11  terrorist attacks.
The  events  surrounding  Padilla  and  Hamdi  also  raise  doubts  about
whether  the  executive  branch  can  exercise  power  with  responsibility,
19.  In a  fascinating  turn of events, the  U.S.  Court of Appeals  for  the  Fourth Circuit-
which had approved  the military detention with charges-opposed  the government's motion
for  an "eleventh-hour  transfer"  because  it jeopardized  Supreme Court review of the matter.
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Let U.S. Transfer Padilla to Civilian Custody, N.Y. Times, Jan.
5,  2006, at A22.
20.  Adam Liptak, Alito  Vote May Be Decisive in Marquee Cases this Term, N.Y. Times,
Feb.  1, 2006, at Al.  It is not clear why the Administration  so  fears  Supreme Court review,
especially with two new appointees.  Note  that Justice Alito hired as a law clerk a former aid
to former Attorney General  John Ashcroft who helped to craft the Administration's policies
in  response to  9/11.  Charles Lane,  Alito Hires as a Clerk Former Ashcroft Aide:  Lawyer
Played  Key Role at Justice Dept., Wash. Post, Feb.  15,  2006, at A12.
21.  Despite  the  history  of  intense  security  concerns,  the  federal  district  court  judge
directed  that Jose  Padilla  should not appear  in handcuffs  in court  unless the  Administration
can  demonstrate  that he  poses a specific  security risk. Vanessa  Blum, Federal  Judge Orders
Padilla's  Cuffs Removed, Sun-Sentinel  (Fort Lauderdale,  Fla.), Feb. 4, 2006, at 8B.
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restraint,  or candor  once  a terrorism  crisis abates.  David Cole voices  such
doubts  in  citing  the  failures  of the  Administration  to  identify  a  single Al-
Qaeda  cell  in  the  United  States  or  to  generate  convictions  through  the
massive  use  of preventive  techniques.22  One  could  go  further  and  ask
whether  whatever  gains  have  been  secured  through  the  Administration's
actions-including  the  use  of  detention  without  charges,  the  denial  of
access  to  attorneys,  the  use  of secret  prisons,  and  the  use  of  coercive
interrogation-outweigh  the  injuries  that  these  actions  pose  to  our
international  image  and our  own principles.  By abandoning  legal  rules  in
the treatment of suspects, we may even inspire more rage against the United
States and fail  the test posed  by Secretary  of Defense Donald  Rumsfeld  in
2003:  "Are  we  capturing,  killing  or  deterring  and  dissuading  more
terrorists  every day than the madrassas  and the radical  clerics are recruiting,
training and deploying against us?" 23
In  sum, the behavior of the executive, the Congress,  and the courts in the
United States since 9/11  cast serious doubts about three key presuppositions
in Ackerman's  book:  (1) that  as time passes after  a major terrorist  attack,
the executive  will permit sufficient information  about  its conduct  to enable
congressional  and judicial  oversight;  (2)  that  Congress will  exercise  more
independent  checks  on  executive  power;  and  (3)  that  minority  party
leadership,  if  given  a  voice,  will  check  majority  party  power  grabs.
Because of these doubts, as well  as the chronic nature of terrorist threats so
well described by Ackerman,  the framework  of "emergency"  is  insufficient
as a way to cabin the powers of the executive.  This would be true whether
the "emergency"  is understood as the ongoing  crisis unleashed since 9/11  or
instead as a new "emergency"  triggered by a next attack.
Hence,  Ackerman's  central  proposals-the  escalating  supermajority
requirement  to  renew  and  extend  executive  authority,  compensation  for
those  wrongfully  detained,  and  permission  to  suspend  fundamental
guarantees  against  detention  without  due  process  or  the  protection  of
sufficient  governmental  suspicion-are  both  practically  implausible  and
conceptually  insufficient  protections  for  national  and  individual  interests.
As an  alternative,  I offer  "security,"  broadly  conceived,  as  the  alternative
for responding to terrorism.  Here I mean to join Ackerman  in rejecting the
frameworks  of war  and  criminal justice  as the proper legal  understandings
of terror.  Yet "security"  rather than "emergency"  more  aptly expresses  and
implements these wise  lessons that Ackerman himself explores:  Proposals
must  (1)  anticipate  fear  and  overreaction  to  terror;  (2)  develop  concrete
22.  David Cole, Are  We Safer?, N.Y.  Review  of Books, Mar.  9, 2006,  at  15  (reviewing
Daniel Benjamin &  Steven  Simon, The Next Attack:  The Failure of the War on Terror and a
Strategy for Getting  it Right (2005)).
23.  Rumsfeld's  War-On-Terror  Memo,  USA  Today  (Online),  May  20,  2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm  (reprinting  a
memorandum  from Donald  Rumsfeld,  dated  October  16,  2003,  posing this  question  along
with  other  inquiries  about  how  to  measure  success  and  failure  in  the  global  war  on
terrorism).
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contingency  plans  that could  be  valuable  in  a  crisis  and  can  sharpen  the
sense  of public  priorities;  (3) attend  to the  long-run  consequences  for our
constitutional  democracy  from  short-term  responses  to  terrorism;  and  (4)
treat  the  totality  of policy  initiatives  responding  to  terror  as  relevant  to
constitutional  analysis,  as  all  the  initiatives  affect  the  viability  of
constitutional rights and checks and balances.
III.  THE NATIONAL  SECURITY CONSTITUTION
Responses to terrorism should reject the rhetoric of war and the paradigm
of  criminal  justice.  Following  Ackerman's  book,  I  believe  that  such
rejection  is the  starting  point for  responsible  counterterrorism  analysis.  I
also  follow  Ackerman  in  treating  the  entire  collection  of national  policy
responses,  not  only judicial  interpretation  of the  Constitution,  as  germane
constitutional  analysis.  Furthermore,  anticipating  the  predictable
overreactions  of  panic  and  fear  is  a  central  imperative  that  entails
maintaining a long-term view about the effects of short-term  reactions.
All of these elements  add up,  in  my mind, to  the  obligation to enhance
national  security directly  and effectively  both before  a next attack  on U.S.
soil  and  after  such an  attack,  should  one  occur.  Surprisingly,  this  central
meaning  of "security"  is  not  the watchword  of U.S.  policies,  despite  the
elaborate organizational  shuffling  involved in the creation of a Department
of  Homeland  Security.  For,  as  many  learned  reports  and  commentators
have noted, the U.S.  response  since 9/11  has left woefully unaddressed key
areas  of  vulnerability  to  terrorism.  These  include  (1)  the  continued
disorganization  of  intelligence  resources  and  inadequate  capacity  to
infiltrate,  interpret,  and  analyze  terrorist  cells  and  domestic  and
international  Arabic  sources;24  (2)  the  continued  exposure  of ports  and
container transport to terrorism;25 (3) the continued  failure to secure nuclear
material  domestically  and  internationally; 26  and  (4)  the  inconsistent
regulation of materials that could be used in bioterrorism.27
Thoughtful  and  specific  proposals  for  strengthening  national  security
abound.  For  example,  in  The Next Attack, Daniel  Benjamin  and  Steven
Simon argue  for  improving  the  nation's  intelligence  capacity;  identifying,
capturing,  and  disrupting  terrorists;  safeguarding  nuclear  materials  and
dangerous  weapons  to  keep them from  hands of terrorists;  identifying  and
24.  See generally 9/11  Comm'n, Final  Report of the National  Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (2004).
25.  See  Stephen  Flynn,  America  the  Vulnerable:  How  Our  Government  Is  Failing  to
Protect Us from Terrorism 81-110 (2004).
26.  See Nat'l Research  Council, Strengthening  Long-Term Nuclear Security 2-3 (2006),
available at http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/l1377.html.  See generally James  L.  Ford &  C.
Richard  Schuller,  Controlling  Threats  to  Nuclear  Security:  A  Holistic  Model  (1997);
Rensselaer  W. Lee  III,  Smuggling Armageddon:  The Nuclear Black Market  in the  Former
Soviet Union and Europe (1998).
27.  See,  e.g.,  Joshua  Lederberg,  Introduction, in  Biological  Weapons:  Limiting  the
Threat 5-7 (Joshua Lederberg ed.,  1999).
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protecting  the  most  vulnerable  targets  in  the  country,  including  container
cargo at shipping  ports,  water  supplies,  and chemical  plants;  and reducing
the  creation  of  new  terrorists  by  addressing  their  grievances.2 8   The
intelligence  capacity in the nation remains  in need of serious  improvement,
given  the  continued  documented  rivalries  and  inefficiencies  that  impaired
interpretation  and  action  before  9/11.  Professional  intelligence  analysts
who  predict  that terrorists  like Zacarias  Massaoui  will fly a plane  into the
World Trade  Center should get  a hearing  at the highest levels.  If this does
not  occur,  then  there  is  something  deeply  broken  in  the  intelligence
apparatus.
Rigorous  understanding  of the  scope  and  meaning  of "security"  should
inform policy.  National  security  in a democracy  entails  not only protecting
borders  and  citizens  from  physical  threat, but  also  promoting  democratic
accountability  and  respect  for  human  rights.  This  broader  conception,
exemplified by the approach to counterterrorism  pursued by Canada, rejects
the assumption that the nation must sacrifice  human rights for security and
instead  treats  both physical  security  and  human  rights as  indispensable  to
national  security.  One reason  given  by the  Canadian  government  for this
treatment  is  that  adherence  to  human  rights  reduces  terrorists'  ability  to
recruit:  "The  first line of defense  in countering terrorist  recruitment  is the
promotion  of accountable,  democratic  governments  that  respect  human
rights,  allow  for peaceful  dissent,  take  action  to  fulfill  the  aspirations  of
their people,  and  respect  diversity." 29  The commitment  to  human  rights
enforcement  runs  deeper,  however,  as  an  element  of personal  security.
When  Irwin  Colter  served as  Minister of Justice  and  Attorney  General  of
Canada,  he explained  that there is no contradiction  between  the protection
of security  and  the  protection  of human  rights  because  each  point  in  the
same  direction:  toward  the  protection  of  personal,  national,  and
international  security.30   Hence,  intelligence  efforts,  border  security,
transportation  security,  and  emergency  planning  must  each  comport  with
the due  process  and the  rule  of law  by consistently prohibiting  torture, by
refusing  to  single  out  minorities  for  discriminatory  treatment,  and  by
adhering  to  clear  sunset  provisions  for  preventive  detention  and
investigatory hearings.31
28.  See generally Daniel Benjamin  and Steven  Simon, The  Next Attack:  The Failure of
the War on Terror  and a Strategy for Getting it Right (2005).
29.  Foreign  Affairs  and  Int'l  Trade  Canada,  Canadian  Dep't  of  Foreign  Affairs,
Terrorism,  http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/intemationalcrime/terrorism-en.asp  (last  visited
Aug.  29, 2006);  see also Gov't of Canada,  Securing  an  Open  Society:  Canada's National
Security  Policy  (2004),  available  at  http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/
NatSecurnat/natsecurnat  e.pdf.
30.  Irwin  Cotler, Minister  of Justice and Attorney  General of Canada, On  the Occasion
of an  Appearance  Before the  Special  Committee  of the  Senate  on  the  Anti-Terrorism  Act
(Feb. 21,  2005), available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/news/sp/2005/doc_31398.html.
31.  Id.
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This conception  of national  security32  is  implicit in  the constitutions  of
South  Africa  and  Poland,  both  of  which  have  provisions  specifying
fundamental  rights  that  must  be  respected  even  during  an  emergency
declared  under those constitutions. 33  Ackerman notes these provisions,  but
he  does not endorse them.  This is surprising.  If  your goal is to minimize
incursions on fundamental  civil liberties during emergencies,  specifying the
rights  that must be respected even during  an emergency  would seem to be
one of the most direct ways to minimize jeopardy to constitutionalism in the
fight against terrorism.  Even if  one predicts that the government,  including
the courts, will not comply one-hundred  percent with such commitments to
preserve  fundamental  rights,  embracing  a  conception  of  security  that
includes  protecting rights-and specifies  rights that cannot be undermined
even  in urgent  contexts-seems  a good place to  start  in reducing  long-run
jeopardy to rights.
Instead,  in the absence  of a rights-protecting provision,  the United States
government  placed  in  charge  of  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security
Michael  Chertoff,  the  very  individual  who  called  for  the  round-up  of
Muslims,  resulting  in  widespread  mistreatment  of detainees  and  not  one
charge  related  to  terrorism.
34   The  Administration  has  systematically
bypassed  warrant  requirements,  arrogating  law  enforcement  and
surveillance  to  itself  without  judicial  supervision,  in  advance  of
congressional  or judicial  approval  for this practice.
35  The  lawyers  for the
White  House  have  pursued  legal  arguments  to  permit  cruel,  degrading
treatment in interrogation and detention.
36
32.  Such  a  conception  of national  security  bears  a modest  resemblance  to  the  United
Nation's  effort  to  build  a  conception  of human  security,  exemplified  by  the  2003  Final
Report of the United Nations Commission  on Human Security:
Human  security  means  protecting  fundamental  freedoms-freedoms  that  are  the
essence  of life.  It  means  protecting  people  from critical  (severe)  and  pervasive
(widespread)  threats  and  situations.  It  means  using  processes  that  build  on
people's  strengths  and  aspirations.  It  means  creating  political,  social,
environmental,  economic,  military  and cultural  systems that  together  give people
the  building  blocks  of survival,  livelihood  and  dignity....  [Human  Security]
encompasses  human rights, good  governance,  access  to education and  health care
and ensuring that each individual has opportunities  and choices to  fulfil his or her
own potential.  Every  step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty,
achieving economic growth and preventing conflict.  Freedom from want, freedom
from  fear  and  the  freedom  of future  generations  to  inherit  a  healthy  natural
environment-these  are  the interrelated  building  blocks  of human,  and  therefore
national, security.
U.N.  Comm'n  on  Human  Sec.,  Human  Security  Now  4  (2003),  available  at
http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf  (internal  quotations
omitted).
33.  See Ackerman, supra  note 2, at 88-90.
34.  William  Finnegan,  Comment:  Homeland Insecurity, New  Yorker,  Feb.  7,  2005,  at
30.
35.  Lowell  Bergman et al.,  Spy Agency Data After Sept.  11 Led FBI  to Dead Ends, N.Y.
Times, Jan.  17,  2006, at Al.
36.  See generally The Torture Papers:  The Road to Abu Ghraib (Karen  J. Greenberg  &
Joshua L. Dratel, eds. 2005).
2006]FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
These  are  failures  of  leadership,  not  exigencies  demanded  by  an
emergency.  Albert J. Mora, the outgoing general counsel of the U.S. Navy,
authored a memo detailing his failed efforts to halt the policy of authorizing
cruelty in the treatment of terror suspects.  He explained,
[P]eople  were  afraid  that  more  9/lls  would  happen,  so  getting  the
information  became  the overriding  objective.  But there  was a  failure  to
look  more  broadly  at  the  ramifications.  These  were  enormously
hardworking, patriotic  individuals.  When you put together the pieces, it's
all  so sad.  To preserve  flexibility, they were willing  to throw  away our
values.
37
"Throwing away"  our values is not only sad;  it also jeopardizes the  security
that the  Constitution  is  intended  to  ensure.  Panic  during emergencies  is
understandable.  That  is  why  Bruce  Ackerman  has  performed  a  crucial
service in pushing lawyers, political leaders, and citizens to think before the
next  terrorism  crisis  and  to  devise  a  plan  that,  in  the  event  of a  crisis,
protects  safety  and maintains  a commitment  to  law.  The  conduct  of law
and politics  in the United States since 2001  suggests;  however, that we need
to  think  more  about  safeguarding  fundamental  rights  and  less  about
assuring executive  power.  We need to think more  about promoting checks
and balances  and  the disclosure  of information  necessary  to  do  so, rather
than  expecting  that  time's  passage  will  generate  more  resistance  to
executive prerogatives.
To  combat terrorism, the government will no doubt continue  discussions
and decisions secluded from public view.  But even so, those who govern  in
our name should pursue both physical security and the protection of human
rights.  For that, we need the activism and  engaged participation  of judges
and  congressional  leaders  in  checking  and  overseeing  executive  actions,
albeit often through in camera proceedings  and closed sessions.
Some  may wonder what in camera  oversight affords.  Here,  even in my
most  pessimistic  moments,  I  would  urge  that  judicial  and  congressional
involvement,  in secret  or closed sessions,  is necessary.  The sheer fact that
executive action will have to be justified to others alters the decisions made
within the  executive branch.  And even if much  that we  value  is sacrificed
in the  meantime,  at  least  such  sessions  hold  out  the  possibility of review
sometime in the future, assuming enough of us and our commitment to law
and  rights  survive.  The  ability  to  review  these  sessions  is  rather  like the
"black  box,"  or cockpit  voice  recorder  and  flight data recorder,  located on
airplanes  and  required  by  the  National  Transportation  Safety  Board.38
These  devices  can  record  engine  sounds,  conversations,  and  technical
navigational  information;  in  case  of  an  accident,  these  devices  help
37.  See Mayer, supra  note  13, at 41.
38.  Nat'l  Transp.  Safety  Bd.,  History  and  Mission,  www.ntsb.gov/ABTNTSB/
history.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).
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investigators  determine  what  went wrong.39  Perhaps  genuine planning  for
our  security  calls  for  establishing  a  National  Security  Safety  Board,
analogous  to the  National  Transportation  Safety  Board,  and directing  it  to
investigate breaches  of both our security  and  the human  rights essential  to
that security.  Our policies and our Constitution should be this kind of black
box,  monitoring  what  is  done  in  our  names,  for our  own  safety.  For if
immediate  public  debate  and  review  is  curtailed  due  to  exigent
circumstances  and  due  to  the  demands  of  security  itself, there  must  be
subsequent  occasions  for  evaluation  and review,  even  in closed  sessions,
both to deter governmental  misconduct and to give the nation the chance to
learn  from its experience.  Government  agents,  even  when  acting with the
best of motives, will not be as careful when they know that nobody  is ever
going to review their conduct than when they know someone will hold them
accountable.  Like  the  cockpit  "black  box,"  our  policies  must  keep
sufficient record of all that is done to permit assessment  later.  Our policies
and  our Constitution  must not  be  determined  by  an  unknowable  decision
maker that remains forever a mystery.
We  should  take  our  fear  as  the  prompt  to  protect  ourselves  and  our
values.  Otherwise,  in our predictable panic, we  may jettison what we care
about  and  give  our  enemies  grounds  to  expose  our  hypocrisy  or,  worse,
celebrate what they made us become.  After 9/11,  we will always  be living
before  the next attack.  As the  short-run becomes  the long-rm,  let us make
sure to sharpen, not dull, tools of accountability and democracy.40
39.  Nat'l  Transp.  Safety  Bd.,  Cockpit  Voice  Recorders  (CVR)  and  Flight  Data
Recorders  (FDR),  www.ntsb.gov/aviation/CVRFDR.htm  (last  visited  Aug.  29,  2006)
(providing  information  on  requirements  established by  the  National  Transportation  Safety
Board,  an  independent  federal  agency  charged  by  Congress  with  investigating  every  civil
aviation accident in the United States).
40.  Unfortunately,  the  Military  Commissions  Act  of  2006  undermines  the  tools  of
accountability  by sharply  curtailing independent  judicial  review  of executive  detentions  of
non-U.S.  citizens  once  the executive  characterizes  them  as enemy  combatants.  See Warren
Richey,  New  Lawsuits Challenge Detainee Act,  Christian  Sci.  Monitor  (Boston),  Oct.  6,
2006, at  1.
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